MR Review Essay

Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion"

by Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry

Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann and John T. Fishel's book *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998) is a priceless primer for staff officers and commanders who are engaged in planning and conducting operations that involve what is known as low-intensity conflict, peacekeeping and such, particularly since the end of the Cold War. One needs only recall the history of the past decade and the names of places such as Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Kurdistan, Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia to understand the concept. Such operations, while limited in scope compared with major theaters of war, tax military commanders' ingenuity and competence as never before.

This book begins with a fascinating review of American interventions in Haiti over the years. In September 1799, US President John Adams provided military supplies to Haitian General Toussaint L'Ouverture as a gesture of support during the Haitian struggle for independence from Napoleonic France. The history of such involvement with Haiti is a warning of the pitfalls awaiting the Army when guidance is vague, planning is disjointed and everyone wants to play "field marshal." The story is about good intentions gone astray because of internal and external dynamics that affected the assigned mission.

Currently "jointness" is the law of the land. Coalitions rather than formal bilateral or regional treaties are the accepted geopolitical entities. The players have grown from a single ship or a small naval contingent to complex operations involving the joint and combined forces of many nations. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the planning that occurred throughout 1994 to answer the challenge conditions in Haiti presented. The Haiti adventure is a bewildering story of the breakdown in the planning processes for the mission.

The second chapter of this book, "Planning For 'Intervasion': The Strategic and Operational Setting for *Uphold Democracy,"* should be required reading for the professional development of any line or staff officer serving in the Army today. The chapter matches the defense planning system—the prescribed method for military planning at strategic and operational levels—and compares it with the specific methodology of US Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*, which is the primary doctrinal text for training staffs about tactical decisions used to execute strategic- and operational-level plans. Incidentally, this chapter begins with an appropriate quote from an anonymous *Uphold Democracy* officer: "The key to this operation is synchronicity and violence of action with spontaneity and simultaneity." Whether with tongue in check or with explicit seriousness of purpose, we seem to have produced a human and literary jewel. Parts of this chapter range from the hilarious to those bordering on stark terror. However, it is easy reading even while thought-provoking. Kretchik's contribution is invaluable. He deserves added praise for his efforts.

The chapter's real lesson is found in its portrayal of how complicated military operations planning has become since World War II. The planning mechanism within the US Department of Defense, coupled with the integration of other government and nongovernment institutions, as well as the active participation of the US National Security Council, provide a glimpse of how complicated the process has become. No excerpt better presents the quandaries posed than the following: "Two different headquarters were now developing two plans, simultaneously, and at two different locations. As the 10th Mountain Division [Light] picked up OPLAN [operation plan] 2380, JTF [Joint Task Force] 180 continued to plan 2370, which would employ the 82d Airborne Division in the kinds of operations for which it, but not the 10th Mountain, had been specifically trained. As for the 10th Mountain Division, although it was subordinate to and less robust than the XVIII Airborne Corps, it was being directed to design an operation that was normally developed by a much larger headquarters."

The critique of this chapter concerning planning is one of the most outstanding attributes of this book, and a study of its contents is bound to pay dividends in professional competence. This chapter should be required reading for military professionals attending officers advanced courses at branch schools to those attending senior service colleges.

In Chapter 3, the authors describe the execution phase of Operation *Uphold Democracy*. What distinguishes this operation from most other military operations is that the original plan was changed after the operation was launched. In fact, the plan was reversed, but the reversal of intention enabled the forces to land peacefully. However, the clarity of the situation became extremely clouded. Were we coming as friends or as enemies? "The agreement permitting the peaceful entry of US and multinational troops into Haiti complicated matters by introducing severe ambiguity into what at that point had seemed a difficult but fairly straightforward undertaking."

There is no question that a psychological readjustment was in order not just for soldiers involved but for the civil populace both in Haiti and the United States. Popular expectations became confused. The bad guys had suddenly become good.

The only comparable event that comes to mind is when General Dwight D. Eisenhower recognized Admiral Jean Darlan as a "good guy" in French North Africa in 1942. Some people have never been reconciled to this and associated events. There also is no question that there were differences in the execution of security requirements between the 10th Mountain Division and special operations forces. The 10th Mountain Division kept force protection its paramount concern and demanded and received the strictest compliance. Special operations forces, on the other hand, "did their thing" among the population, mixing with the natives and promoting a relaxed relationship in the countryside. This execution of opposites concerning the force's intent is worthy of further study. It provides much food for thought about internal and external, as well as senior and subordinate, relationships.

Fishel, the author of Chapter 4, discusses the measurement of Army effectiveness. He appears to be "heralding the failure of a mission that has been touted as nearly a complete success," and he asks: "How can we explain this seeming paradox?" His conclusion is that the "problem lies in the linkage between the strategic and operational levels of conflict. In fact, the issue is that there was a disconnect between the strategic objective of restoring and upholding democracy and the operational objective of maintaining a secure and stable environment in Haiti. What was required to ensure strategic success was a set of operational objectives leading clearly to the upholding of democracy, which would describe an operational end state that made the desired democratic outcome as nearly certain as possible. This was not accomplished. . . . The probable strategic value of the 'intervasion' of Haiti has roots in the fact alluded to in [the] discussion of planning; that is, the political-military plan for Haiti, the first of its kind, was poorly integrated with the strictly military plans."

The book contains several appendixes, including a complete historical chronology of events in Haiti. The authors are to be commended for a work of current history that presents problems and provides guidance for the solution of these problems in the event US forces must confront comparable situations in the future. With this book, Kretchik, Baumann and Fishel have made an important and considerable contribution to the literature of LIC and peacekeeping operations.

Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry, US Army, Retired, is program manager, Army Force Management School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy, and he is a graduate of the US Army War College. He served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Europe, including Inspector General of the Army, 1978-1983. He has written extensively for ARMY *magazine,* Parameters *and* Military Review.

MR Letters

CO²: Is it Worthwhile?

This letter is in response to an article I read on-line [http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/index.htm] in the May-June 1998 issue of the *Military Review*, titled "CO²: Lessons Learned," by Captain Malcolm B. Frost. Although I do not understand how a program taught by the Defense Equal Opportunity (EO) Management Institute "is not about EO," what really caught my attention was the tone of Frost's article. I found his advice to send skeptics to "facilitator training courses" and have leaders "take necessary action via counseling, administrative and other legal means [to demonstrate] their commitment and belief in the program" particularly troubling.

Frost's advice sounds like it was pulled from a Soviet commissar's training manual and makes me question the efficacy of a program that requires communist-style training techniques in order to ensure "success." Is Frost suggesting that article 15s, chapters and courts-martial are necessary to punish soldiers for . . . what? Being inconsiderate? Not demonstrating enough enthusiasm for CO²? Recently, I have read several articles about the CO² program, sat through a CO² briefing (given by an EO representative), watched the CO² video and even accessed the CO² web site. The more propaganda I'm exposed to, the more I'm convinced that our Army is better off with CO² kept permanently within the Military District of Washington. Please don't send me to a re-education camp.

Major Craig A. Collier, *USA,*
Fort Shafter, Hawaii

CO² is for You

I appreciate Major Craig A. Collier's comments and hope his candor is matched by his understanding of the Consideration of Others (CO²) program. I believe the concepts behind CO² and its values-based origins are clear examples of what sets American society and its Armed Forces apart from the former Soviet Union. The ability of our culture to break down religious, ethnic and social barriers and see beyond individual differences has allowed us to build a better environment and more efficient organizations. Yet we are not perfect, and CO², as part of our continuing adult education, allows us to build teamwork and reach new goals as an organization. CO² values also enable us to return soldiers to society as better citizens than when they entered the Army.

CO² is also about the human dimension of leadership. Leaders must "walk the walk" and enforce policy and regulations which fall under CO². In everything they do, leaders must lead by example and enforce clearly defined standards. That is the best way for soldiers to gain ownership of the CO² program. I have seen the CO² payoff in units—it works—and in the long run, it will help our diverse Army come together as teams prepared to execute whatever mission is required.

Major Malcolm B. Frost, *USA,*
Alexandria, Virginia